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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathan A. Collins appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to seal
his criminal case file.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
During a videotaped police interview, Collins admitted he had used his hand to
touch three-year-old A.T.'s vagina, over her clothing, for about one second.
3:09:15 - 3:35:45.)

(Ex. 1,

Based on his admission, the state filed a Criminal Complaint

charging Collins with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.67.) Collins waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to district court. (R.,
p.25, 28-30.)

Collins, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress his interview

statements (R., pp.39-40), and a hearing was set for December 14, 2011 (R., p.63).
The day before the hearing, the state filed a motion to dismiss the case, stating, "In the
interest of justice, the State no longer wishes to proceed with this matterL]" which was
granted. (R., pp.71-72.)
Almost two years later, Collins filed a Motion to Seal Court Record, claiming
"public access to [his] case has caused him financial hardship due to two prospective
employers denying him employment because of his association with this case," and
because "public access to this case might be libelous or threaten [his] safety[.]" (R.,
pp.74-81.) After a hearing, the district court denied Collins' motion to seal the court
records in his dismissed case (R., pp.107-109; Tr., ppA-7), ruling that lithe public's
interest in information and the government's obligation for transparency" outweighed

1

Collins' "need and desire to seal his court file" (R., p.108). Collins filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.102-104.)
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ISSUE
Collins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Collins' motion
to seal his court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i)?
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Collins failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his request to seal his criminal case file where it determined that the public interest in
disclosure predominated over Collins' desire for privacy?
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ARGUMENT

Collins Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying
His Motion To Seal His Criminal Record
A.

Introduction
Collins asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion

to seal the criminal record in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-11.) Application of the
correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows that the district court
correctly recognized its discretion and exercised that discretion appropriately. Collins
has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Decisions by the district court to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court

Administrative Rule 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen, 147
Idaho 869,872,216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009).

C.

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Determining That The
Public's Interest In Disclosure Predominated Over Any Of Collins' Purported
Privacy Interests In Sealing His Criminal File
Criminal judgments cannot be sealed absent the clearest showing of an

overriding personal privacy interest without infringing on the public's constitutional right
to information.

As explained by the United States Supreme Court, in the context of

criminal trials, the public has a right, protected by the First Amendment, to know what
goes on in its courts.
(1980).

Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576

The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment does not just

protect expressing ideas and disseminating information, but receiving information and
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ideas.

See

kL

(citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)); see also

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (right to publish implies a right to gather
information). Indeed, "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw." Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978)) (emphasis added).

Criminal proceedings are, and have been since time

immemorial, presumptively open.

kL

at 564-74.

Therefore, "[a]bsent an overriding

interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."

kL at 581.
Consistent with the public's constitutional right to know what transpires in criminal
proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, "pursuant to [its] authority to control access to
court records," promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32. I.C.A.R. 32(a). At the
beginning of Rule 32, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly laid out its statement of policy:
The public has a right to examine and copy the judicial department's
declarations of law and public policy and to examine and copy the records
of all proceedings open to the public. This rule provides for access in a
manner that:
(1) Promotes accessibility to court records;
(2) Supports the role of the judiciary;
(3) Promotes governmental accountability;
(4) Contributes to public safety;
(5) Minimizes the risk of injury to individuals;
(6) Protects individual privacy rights and interests;
(7) Protects proprietary business information;
(8) Minimizes reluctance to use the court system;
(9) Makes the most effective use of court and clerk of court
staff;
(10) Provides excellent customer service; and
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(11) Avoids unduly burdening the ongoing business of the
judiciary.
In the event of any conflict this rule shall prevail over any other rule
on the issue of access to judicial records.
Id.
Striking a balance between the public's constitutional right to access criminal
records and the privacy interests of individuals, Rule 32 exempts from disclosure highly
private information, such as PSis, most unreturned warrants, documents that would
identify jurors on a Grand Jury, and jury questionnaires. I.C.A.R. 32(g). Duly entered
criminal judgments, however, are not exempted from disclosure under Rule 32.
In very narrow circumstances, court records may also be sealed under Rule
32(i). The rule does not allow the district court unfettered discretion to seal case files;
rather, a court is only allowed to seal portions of a case file after it finds that the
petitioner's privacy interests predominate over the public's constitutional right to know.
I,C.A.R. 32(i).

Even then, U[i]f the court redacts or seals records to protect

predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exemption from
disclosure consistent with privacy interests." Id. Accordingly, before a district court may
seal any portion of a case file, it must first determine in writing:
(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or
statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a
reasonable person, or
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements
that the court finds might be libelous, or
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements,
the dissemination or publication of which would reasonably result in
economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an interest in the
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, records
or public property of or used by the judicial department, or
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(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements
that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents
or materials to preserve the right to a fair trial.
Id.
Rule 32(i) "requires that the district court 'hold a hearing on the motion' and
'determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or public
disclosure predominates.'"

State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504, 272 P.3d 474, 476

(2012) (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)).

The district court does not abuse its discretion by

denying a motion to seal a criminal record after it determines that the public's interest in
disclosure of the criminal proceedings predominates over the petitioner's asserted
privacy interest.

kL. at 504-505,

272 P.3d at 476-477.

Collins moved the district court to seal his criminal file under Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 32(i), claiming that he suffered economic harm because "two
prospective employers den[ied] him employment because of his association with this
caseL]" and that "public access to this case might be libelous or threaten the safety of
Mr. Collins." (R., p.74.) The district court, as required by Rule 32(i), held a hearing on
Collins' motion.

(Tr., pp.3-7.)

No testimony was presented at the hearing, and no

affidavit had been presented to support Collins' motion. (R., p.108 n.1.) The district
court ruled from the bench that "having reviewed several times the motion to seal the
court record, the applicable rules, the case law on point, I do believe that the public
interest in looking at this court record outweighs Mr. Collins's [sic] desire and interest,
economic interest, to have the court record sealed." (Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.) The district
court subsequently entered an Order Denying Motion to Seal Court Record, and
reiterated:
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The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to seal a court
record is committed to the discretion of the district court. State v. Gurney,
152 Idaho 502, 503, 272 P.3d 474, 475 (2012). The default position, as
reflected in Idaho's public records law, is that all public records are open at
all reasonable times for inspection. Idaho Code § 9-33S(1). It is
Defendant's burden to overcome this presumption. Gurney, 152 Idaho at
504, 272 P.3d at 476 n.1 (it is the moving party's burden to prove that
court records should be sealed.) The defendant in this case did not meet
his burden. [Footnote omitted.]
The court weighed the public's interest in information and the
government's obligation for transparency against the Defendant's need
and desire to seal his court file. After weighing the competing interests,
the Court denied Defendant's motion to seal the record. The Court noted
that it would reconsider its ruling if the Defendant could show evidence
that the prosecution had filed the charge in bad faith or for an improper
purpose, or that probable cause did not exist at the time the charge was
filed.
(R., pp.107-10S.) In a footnote, the district court further explained that it "assumed for
the purpose of deciding the motion that [Collins'] claims were true -- that [he] was
challenged in finding employment and stigmatized by the accusation of a sex offense."
(R., p.10S n.1.) The record shows that the district court weighed the public's interest in
disclosure against Collins' interest in privacy. The district court properly exercised its
discretion, and Collins has failed to show any abuse of that discretion.
On appeal, Collins first asserts the district court abused its discretion by not
adequately considering "that the documents or materials in [his] court records contain
facts or statements that might be libelous[,]" including the Complaint and Information.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-S.) Collins specifically argues:
[A.T.'s mother], the original source of the allegation against Mr. Collins had
lied to police officers in the past. When viewed alongside the State's
request that the district court dismiss the charge against [him] "in the
interest of justice," a request that closely followed [his] giving notice of his
intent to present evidence on [A.T.'s mother's] past lies, [her] history of
lying indicates that she was also lying about Mr. Collins' alleged lewd

S

conduct. Thus, the statements that Mr. Collins committed the crime of
lewd conduct are defamatory per se.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (citations to record omitted) (explanation added).)
Collins' logic is flawed. Even assuming AT.'s mother lied to police in the past, it
does not necessarily follow that she also lied about AT.'s statements in this case. Nor
does the fact that Collins notified the state of his intent to present such evidence at trial
render the state's subsequent dismissal of the case an "indicat[ion] that she was also
lying about Mr. Collins' alleged lewd conduct."i

(Id.)

Moreover, in light of Collins'

admission to Detective Heatherley that he had placed his hand on AT.'s vagina, outside
her clothing for about one second, and immediately thought to himself, "Oh shit, what
the fuck just happened" (Ex. 1, 3:09: 15 - 3:35:45), Collins' claims of libel and defamation
ring hollow.
Collins next argues the district court failed to adequately consider the financial
loss he suffered "as a result of public access to the court records in this caseL]" as
evidenced by "two prospective employers denying him employment because of his
association with this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) If by "adequately consider" Collins
means the district court did not understand his economic situation or weigh it against
the state's interest in public access to court records, the record shows otherwise. As
noted, the court verbally ruled, "having reviewed several times the motion to seal the
court record, the applicable rules, the case law on point, I do believe that the public
interest in looking at this court record outweighs Mr. Collins' desire and interest,

It is just as likely that the state's motion to dismiss, filed December 13, 2011, was
motivated by a perceived problem with prevailing at a suppression hearing, set one day
later, on Collins' motion to suppress the statements he made during his police interview.
(R., pp.39-40, 53-63, 71.)
1
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economic interest, to have the court record sealed."

(Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.)

Simply

because the district court did not give Collins' "negative economic impact" claim the
weight he desires does not show that the court abused its discretion.
Finally, Collins argues that, because he "regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous
with parolees and probationers who, he fears, could harm him if they were to discover
he had once been charged with a sex offense[,]" the district court should have sealed
the court records. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Apart from being based on speculation, the
record shows Collins' contention is incorrect. The district court explained at the hearing
that it had "reviewed several times the motion to seal the court record" (Tr., p.5, LS.1420), which included Collins' assertion that he fears for his safety when he attends
Alcoholics Anonymous (R., p.79).

The district court's written order covered Collins'

claim in general terms, explaining that, at the motion hearing, it had "weighed the
public's interest in information and the government's obligation for transparency against
the Defendant's need and desire to seal his court file[,]" and "[a]fter weighing the
competing interests, the Court denied Defendant's motion to seal the record."

(R.,

p.108.)
Collins has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to seal his criminal case file.

As recognized by Rule 32, the public's

constitutional right to access criminal records H[cJontributes to public safety" and
H[m]inimizes the risk of injury to individuals." See I.C.A.R. 32(a). The district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Collins' motion to seal the record of his criminal
conviction after it correctly determined that Collins' privacy interests did not predominate
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over the public's interest in disclosure. The district court's order denying Collins' motion
to seal should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Collins' motions to seal his criminal case file.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2014, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy addressed to:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender'S basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

. McKinney
Attorney General
JCM/pm
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